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The objective of this study is to establish whether TDRMs in Kenya engender the right to a fair 
hearing in the adjudication of disputes Chapter 1 lays the background, it states the objectives and 
explains the theoretical framework of this study.  Chapter 2 looks into the nature of the right to a 
fair hearing, chapter 3 examines the nature of TDRMs including the perspective provided by the 
courts. Chapter 4 seeks to address the question of the extent to which TDRMs engender the right 
to a fair hearing in the adjudication of disputes. Chapter 5 explains the findings of this study then 
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Introduction to the Study 
1.0 Introduction 
  This chapter provides an introduction to the study with a view to provide information 
on the basis of the study. The chapter endeavours to provide information on the background to 
the study with the aim of explaining the need for carrying out the research. This part of the 
study details the statement of the problem, a justification for the study, the theoretical 
framework, the objectives and hypothesis of the study. Finally, the chapter explains the 
research methodology, the chapter breakdown and provides a timeline in which the study was 
conducted. Chapter one acts as a guide for the research and provides a framework through 
which the research was done.   
1.1 Background to the problem 
Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (TDRMs) synonymous with Traditional 
Justice Systems (TJS),1 are a form of out of court dispute resolution system based on customs 
and traditions of communities. The Constitution of Kenya 2010,2 provides a legal basis for the 
application of TDRMs. The legal framework affords courts and tribunals the opportunity to 
apply the mechanism (TDRMs) in settling various disputes, and now criminal cases following 
the decision in Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed.3 Communities use TDRMs to settle 
disputes making them useful in enhancing access to justice, promoting social justice and 
fostering peaceful co-existence.4 The right to a fair hearing is a fundamental right as provided 
in Article 50 of the constitution. The right, is to the extent that; every person is afforded the 
opportunity to have any dispute resolved by application of law decided in a fair and public 
hearing before a court or independent and impartial tribunal or body.5 Article 50(2) further 
specifies the nature of the right to include rudimental ingredients namely6; 
                                                                 
1 Kariuki M & Kariuki F, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Access to Just ice and Development in Kenya’ 1 (1) 
Strathmore Law Journal, (2015), 4. 
2 Article 159, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
3 Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed [2011] eKLR. 
4 Kariuki M, Kariuki F, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution, Access to Justice and Development in Kenya ’, 4. 
5 Article 50 (1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
6 Article 50 (2), Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
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a.  the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,  
b. the right to be informed of the charge, with sufficient detail to answer, 
c.  to have adequate time to prepare a defence,  
d. to a public trial,  
e. the right to begin and conclude without unreasonable delay, 
f.  to be present when being tried, to choose and be represented by an advocate and to be 
informed of the right promptly, 
g.  to remain silent and not to testify during proceedings, to be informed in advance of the 
evidence the prosecution seeks to rely on and have reasonable access to evidence, 
h.  to remain silent and not testify during proceedings, 
i.  to adduce and challenge evidence, 
j.  to refuse to give self-incriminating evidence,  
k. to have the assistance of an interpreter without payment if the person does not 
understand the language being used at trial,  
l. not to be convicted for a crime that was not an offence in Kenya, or under international 
law, 
m.  not to be convicted of a crime to which they have been acquitted or convicted,  
n. if convicted to appeal to, or apply review by, a higher court as prescribed by law .  
Looking at the nature of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, rules and procedures to 
ensure that the right to a fair hearing is protected are not set in place. In Ndeto Kimomo v Kavoi 
Musumba 7 the applicant’s request to have the case turned to TDRM was dismissed. The reason 
for the decision was that TDRMS lack mechanisms in upholding a fair hearing. It is therefore 
the intention of this paper to examine the nature of Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
in light of the right to a fair hearing and elicit information as to the need for a legal framework 
to regulate the application of the same.   
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
Looking at the nature of TJS in relation to constitutional provisions on the right to a fair 
hearing, it is evident that the application of TJS in dispute resolution in particular criminal 
matters, does not meet the threshold set for the protection of the right to a fair hearing. On the 
onset, the right to prepare a defence as well as the right to choose and be represented by an 
advocate and to be informed of the right promptly is absent seeing that TJS are an out of court 
                                                                 
7 Ndeto Kimomo v Kavoi Musumba [1977] eKLR. 
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settlement process. Further, the right to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable 
delay is challenging to achieve where the presiding elder(s) die and the community has to 
adhere to strict lengthy customs in choosing a replacement elder. The right to adduce and 
challenge evidence also lacks owing to the informal nature of TJS, in which rules of evidence 
are not present. The right to autrefois acquit and autrefois convict as envisioned by Article 50 
(2)(o) is absent given the informal/illiterate nature of TDRMs in which accused persons could 
still stand trial where an aggrieved party seeks to maliciously avenge themselves. The right to 
challenge evidence is not present in communities that uphold customs prejudicial to women to 
the effect that women are not allowed to challenge men, who form the council of elders. Thus 
for example, the Bukusu society upholds a patriarchal leadership structure. Men dominate the 
leadership roles and are regarded as superior, to rule over women. Women in the Bukusu 
society on the other hand are considered weaker vessels, whose pride is derived from and 
dependent on men and are thus barred from challenging any man, especially presiding elders.8  
The nature of TDRMs also deprive the parties the right to appeal whereas the decision of the 
council of elders is held to be final and binding on the parties as they are considered supreme 
and wise in the making of decisions.  
1.3 Justification of the Study 
Looking at the promulgation of the 2010 constitution and more so its provisions in 
Article 159 on TDRMs, it is evident that Kenya’s judicial system is taking a turn for the better 
in enhancing the access to justice to all people. This presents a foreseeable increase in the use 
of alternative dispute resolution including TDRM, to provide dispute resolution for persons 
who cannot access courts for financial constraints or geographical and language barriers. It is 
upon this premise that the study is important to point out the need for the right to a fair hearing 
in TDRM as well as recommend the establishment of a concrete legal framework. Also, looking 
at the precedent set in R v Mohamed Abdow Mohammed 9 it is evident that TDRM may very 
well plunge into adjudicating criminal matters and it is thus essential that the right to a fair 
hearing be integrated in TDRMs.  
                                                                 
8 Wanjala W, ‘Spotlight on Harmful Traditional Practices and  Customs in Kenya’ Wordpress, 4 August 2013 
https://wanjalawafula.wordpress.com/2013/08/04/spotlight-on-harmfu l-trad itional-pract ices-and-customs-in-
kenya/ on 5 October 2017. 
9 Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed [2013] eKLR. 
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1.4 Objective of the Study 
The overarching objective of this study is to investigate the nature of TDRMs as well as 
the principles of the right to a fair hearing. In achieving the objectives, the research answers 
the following queries; 
1. What is entailed in the right to a fair hearing? 
2. What is the nature of Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms? 
3. Do TDRMs engender the right to a fair hearing in the proceedings? 
1.5 Literature Review 
The subject Traditional Justice Systems in Kenya, has been studied by various scholars 
who have approached the matter from different angles.   
1.51 The recognition of TDRMS 
Kariuki Muigua & Kariuki Francis, in the work; ‘ADR, Access to Justice and 
Development in Kenya’, talk about Alternative Dispute Resolution and Traditional Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms. In the work, they point out the need for these two forms of dispute 
resolution in order to enhance access to justice by all and especially the poor. The article also 
points out the fact that alternative forms of dispute resolution also promotes the Rule of Law, 
and are important to foster development. The article thus advocates for the recognition of 
TDRMs within the legal framework of Kenya in order to foster development. The article in 
light of this study is useful as it propagates the need for TDRMs in settling matters as well as 
its allusion to the nature of the mechanism, however it falls short of providing a rationale for 
the need for the application of the right to a fair hearing. The article does not go deep into the 
matters of the legal framework of TDRMs in so far as the right to a fair hearing is concerned.  
Kariuki Muigua in the write up ‘Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms under 
Article 159 of The Constitution of Kenya 2010’, outlines the recognition of TDRMs under the 
2010 constitution. The article focuses TDRMs under Article 159 of the Kenyan Constitution, 
and advocates for it owing to its effectiveness in managing conflicts. The article further points 
out the importance of TDRMs to the effect that their role is recognised globally (they not only 
exist in Africa but also in Sardinia an Island in the Mediterranean Sea) and they lighten the 
burden of the courts. The author alludes to the need for the TDRMs to be modified to conform 
to international human rights standards thus enumerating the fact that TDRMs are yet to 
conform to human rights standards, a part of it being the right to a fair hearing. The article in 
this light is instrumental in demonstrating the recognition of TDRMs in the Kenyan legal 
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system as a mode of dispute resolution, by its allusion to the fact that they need to conform to 
international human rights standards it demonstrates the gap sought to be addressed by this 
study, but however does not talk much about the right to a fair hearing in TDRMs.  
The case in Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed, sets precedence on the use of 
TDRMs in litigation and especially in criminal matters. The case provides reason to foresee 
circumstances in which TDRMs will be incrementally used to settle matters in the coming 
future more so criminal matters. The learned judges’ decision however fails to give a guideline 
on the missing factor essential to adjudication in TDRMs; the right to a fair hearing. As such, 
the case is instrumental in justifying the need for the study and furthermore in a bid to 
recommend the crafting and inclusion of the right to a Fair Hearing in TDRMs legal framework. 
1.52 The Nature of TDRMs 
The book; ‘Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems in Africa’10, is highly 
instrumental to the study as it explains the nature of TDRMs. The book explains the salient 
features to include the adjudicating parties namely; chiefs or sub-chiefs, headmen, or a group 
of elders or the community at large in form of a general assembly.11 Further, the book states 
that the authority of the leader derives from their status as a respected member of the 
community, including inheritance of the position.12 The leaders are set in place specifically to 
hear and resolve disputes in a sense performing judicial/quasi-judicial roles as the work 
explains.13 In explaining the nature of TDRMs, the book further points out the shortcomings 
of the mechanism to include the fact that since the presiding leaders are powerful members of 
the community, a risk exists to the nature that their decisions are impartial where they take into 
account their own interests in maintaining power.14 Moreover, their decisions may be 
                                                                 
10 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, United Nations Publication, New York, 2016, 16.  
11 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, 23.  
12 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, 23. 
13 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, 23. 
14 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, 27.  
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susceptible to politicization where elected political leaders may influence the elders.15 The 
book is therefore useful to the study in that it provides a framework on TJSs to the extent that 
it also demonstrates how TJSs do not fully protect the right to a fair hearing.  
1.53 The Right to A Fair Hearing    
The book; ‘Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems in Africa’ is still highly 
instrumental to this portion of the study. In addition to providing knowledge on the nature of 
TDRMs, the book goes deeper into providing salient aspects of human rights more so in relation 
to TJSs to the extent that it also talks of the right to a fair trial. The book being a creation of an 
international body gives a broad perspective on the right to a fair hearing as it also gives an 
international law perspective. As such, the book is instrumental in reinforcing the need for the 
study to ensure the right to a fair trial is upheld in TJSs seeing that the right is universal.  
The case of Ndeto Kimomo v Kavoi Musumba16 is instrumental in the study as the decision 
made to deny the parties to refer their matter to TDRMs for the lack of mechanisms protecting 
the right to a fair hearing is key in explaining the importance of the right to a fair hearing. The 
case is also instrumental in justifying the hypothesis of the study as it demonstrates the extent 
to which TDRMs fall short in protecting the right to a fair hearing. 
1.54 Conclusion of the Study.   
FIDA KENYA’s work on Traditional Justice Systems in Kenya, focuses on the use of 
TJS in coastal communities in Kenya17. The work studies traditional Justice Systems in selected 
communities in a bid to recommend reforms in the legal arena which would result in the 
promotion of access to justice by vulnerable groups for example women. The work similar to 
the study, first acknowledges the legal existence of TDRMs in Kenya and also points out the 
need for reforms, in TDRMs. FIDA KENYA’s research is instrumental to the study in that it 
provides information on the nature of  TDRMs in Kenyan communities. The study eliminates 
the need for a field study, in conducting this research. Most importantly however, the authors 
demonstrate how TDRMs fall short of protecting the sanctity of the access to justice in Kenya. 
                                                                 
15 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights and Traditional Justice Systems 
in Africa, 49.  
16 Ndeto Kimomo v Kavoi Musumba [1977] eKLR. 
10 FIDA KENYA, ‘Traditional Justice Systems in Kenya: A Study of Communities in Coast Province, Kenya’ 





The work however focuses on the rights of the vulnerable especially women and in this light it 
says little about the right to a fair hearing in itself, but is very instrumental to the work as it 
provides a basis for the statement of the problem in TJS. 
1.6 Theoretical Framework  
1.61 Natural justice theory  
Natural justice has been coined to mean the natural sense of what is right or wrong as stated 
by Lord Esther in Vionet v Barrett.18 Though simply put, it entails more than just the sense of 
right or wrong. The theory bears the term justice and as put by Aristotle, justice is lawfulness 
or fairness as injustice brings about a state of lawlessness and unfairness.19 Taking the two 
perspectives, the term natural has been provided to mean a sense in man, while the term justice 
has been explained to mean fairness which brings about the state of lawfulness and fairness. 
Combining the two terms bringing about the term natural justice, however gives it a deeper 
meaning applicable in the execution of justice. Thus the theory; natural justice goes deeper in 
setting rules governing adjudication of matters. The theory was developed by courts of equity 
to control decisions of lower courts and further developed to govern administrative bodies and 
it serves to ensure procedural fairness and fair decision making is achieved by judicial 
authorities. In turn it enables the achievement of public confidence in a judicial system. The 
principle encompasses two maxims; audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) and nemo judex 
in parte sua (no person may judge their own case). As a result of the theory, common law20 
rules have been formulated to include; 
a) The hearing rule; a person ought to be given adequate time to present their case, 
especially where their interests and rights may be negatively affected by an adjudicator. 
The rule goes to the extent of allowing a person adequate opportunity to prepare and 
adduce evidence as well as challenge evidence produced by the adverse party and to 
challenge rebuttals against them. The alleged wrongdoer also ought to be afforded the 
chance to be informed of the allegations before them.  
b) The bias rule; no one ought to be judge in their trial, the rule requires that an adjudicator 
be completely impartial in adjudicating the matters before him. The rule extends to 
investigators who should guard against conflict of interest, in conducting investigations 
                                                                 
18 Vionet v Barret [1885] 55 LJQB 39, 41. 
19 Ross W.D, Arisotle Nicomachean Ethics book V , Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999. 
20 https://gaurlaw.wordpress.com/2015/05/01/natural-justice-ru le-of-fair-hearing/, on 13 October 2017.  
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and collecting evidence. The rule also extends to any appearance of actual or apparent 
bias, in which if found to exist on the part of a decision maker, deprives them of the 
credibility to adjudicate the matter.  
c) The evidence rule; investigators should not base their findings on speculation or 
suspicion rather it should be clear that their findings are based on logical proof or 
material evidence. Evidence obtained by one party is also subject to scrutiny by a party 
against whom it is adduced.  
1.7 Hypothesis  
The use of TDRMS does not engender the right to a fair hearing in dispute resolution. 
1.8 Research Design & Methodology   
Based on the subject of study, the viable data collection method would have been 
qualitative method. The method involves the collection of data from a sample of items drawn 
from a population through the utilisation of questionnaires. The method is best as it provides 
fast hand information on the situation on the ground. However, owing to time and financial 
constraints, a desk study was the most preferred method of data collection for the study.    
The research therefore adopted a multidisciplinary approach in which data was 
collected using the black letter approach as well as comparative analysis approach. The black 
letter approach entails the use of both primary sources and secondary sources of data. The 
primary sources included; a study of case law and statutes to which the law regulating the 
subject matter was obtained. The material was sourced from legal sources such as the Kenya 
Law Reports and case books as located in the legal section of the Strathmore University Library 
and online. The secondary sources on the other hand included; articles, journals, books and 
dissertations written on the topic in a bid to providing a clear understanding of the disciplines 
studied. The secondary sources were obtained from online sources among them being 
Strathmore University’s depository site in which dissertations are availed.  
1.9 Chapter Breakdown  
Chapter 1: Introduction.  
The chapter provides a concise background to the problem. It also includes a brief 
statement of the research problem, a justification for the study as well as the objectives of the 
study and including the hypothesis and the literature review. Furthermore, the chapter provides 
a theoretical framework of the study a window through which the literature on the study will 
be analysed. The chapter finally records the research design and methodology providing a 
guide in the conduct of the research.  
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Chapter2: The right to a fair hearing in Kenya. 
The main focus of the chapter is to examine the nature of the right to a fair hearing in 
Kenya, in light of the legal framework applicable in Kenya as well as the international 
instruments providing for the right. The chapter will go further to provide the importance of 
the right in adjudication over matters.  
Chapter 3: The nature of TDRMs in Kenya. 
The chapter endeavors to provide an explanation as to the nature of TDRMs. The nature 
of TDRMs is explained in reference to statutes regulating TJSs, case law and a case study on 
TJS in communities in Kenya, namely; the Somali, Agikuyu and Pokot communities 
representing a sample of TJS in Kenya.  
Chapter 4: To What Extent do TDRMs in Kenya Enshrine the Right to A Fair Hearing. 
This portion of the study endeavors to demonstrate to the reader in light of the findings 
in chapter three, the extent to which the application of the right to a fair hearing is provided for 
in TDRMs and or the extent to which it falls short of the legally set standard, depending on the 
findings of the research. 
Chapter 5: Conclusions, Findings and Recommendations. 
This portion of the study provides for the findings of the study in a bid to form the 
conclusion of the study. The findings are in relation to the, objectives of the study, and the 
hypothesis of the study. This chapter draws the reader to recommendations based on the 
findings of the study.  
1.90 Timeline/Duration 











The Right to a Fair Hearing in Kenya 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature of the right to a fair hearing. It seeks to outline what 
the right to a fair hearing entails as provided by statutes and case law. The statutes to be 
considered include the Constitution of Kenya and international instruments explaining the 
right. Case law includes Kenyan cases and international cases demonstrating the application of 
the right to a fair hearing.  
2.2 The Right to a Fair Hearing under the Constitution of Kenya 
In Kenya, the nature of the right to a fair hearing is explained under Article 50 of the 
Constitution. The right, is to the extent that; every person is afforded the opportunity to have 
any dispute resolved by application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court 
or independent and impartial tribunal or body.21 The ingredients of the right to a fair hearing 
include the right; 
a. to be presumed innocent until proven guilty;  
b. to be informed of the charge, with sufficient detail to answer; 
c. to have adequate time to prepare a defence; 
d. to a public trial;  
e. to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay; 
f. to be present when being tried, to choose and be represented by an advocate and to 
be informed of the right promptly; 
g. to remain silent and not to testify during proceedings, to be informed in advance of 
the evidence the prosecution seeks to rely on and have reasonable access to 
evidence; 
h.  to remain silent and not testify during proceedings; 
i.  to adduce and challenge evidence; 
j.  to refuse to give self-incriminating evidence; 
k. to have the assistance of an interpreter without payment if the person does not 
understand the language being used at trial;  
                                                                 
21 Article 50 (1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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l. not to be convicted for a crime that was not an offence in Kenya, or under 
international law; 
m. not to be convicted of a crime to which they have been acquitted or convicted and 
n. to appeal to, or apply for review by, a higher court if convicted, as prescribed by 
law.  
2.3 The Right to a Fair Hearing as Explained by Case Law. 
Case law has clearly demonstrated the operation of this provision. The importance of 
the right to a fair hearing was stated in Joseph Ndungu Kagiri v Republic of Kenya22 as one of 
the cornerstones of a just society. In Joseph Ndungu Kagiri v Republic of Kenya,23 the appellant 
and the co-accused were charged with the offence of stealing contrary to Section 275 of the 
Penal Code and handling stolen property contrary to Section 322(2) of the Penal Code 
respectively. The Judge in allowing the appeal stated that the Trial Court in entering a verdict 
of guilty occasioned a miscarriage of justice as the accused rights to fair hearing were not 
upheld. The right to choose and be represented by an advocate, the right to have an advocate 
assigned by the State at the expense of the State and subsequently the right to have adequate 
time and facilities to prepare a defence as under Article 50(g), 50(h) and 50(c) of the 
Constitution respectively were contravened. Consequently, the Judge allowed the appeal 
stating strongly that; 
 “…I find that the appellant and his co-accused were not afforded a fair trial 
and that the entire proceedings were a sham and gross violation of constitutional 
provisions safeguarding a fair trial… In fact I hold the view that the trial was 
conducted in a manner that was prejudicial to the accused persons and caused injustice 
and grave prejudice to the appellant and his co-accused. Such proceedings cannot be 
allowed to stand.” 24  
In a fairly recent case, The Judicial Service Commission and Hon. Mr. Justice Mbalu 
Mutava and The Attorney General,25 the court explained fair hearing under Article 50(1) to 
apply where any dispute can be resolved by the application of the law and applies to 
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proceedings before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
body and further stated that the right cannot be limited by law or otherwise as under Article 
25(c) of the Constitution.  
The right to a fair hearing and in particular the presumption of innocence and the right 
to trial without undue delay, created under Article 50(2)(a) and 50(2)(e) has been read to be 
compatible with the right to bail as under Article 49 (h) of the Constitution. In Nganga v 
Republic26 the Judge stated that; 
“Admittedly, admission to bail is a Constitutional right of an accused person 
if he is not going to be tried reasonably soon, but before the right is granted to the 
Accused there are a number of matters to be considered even without the 
Constitutional provisions.  Generally in principal, and because of the presumption that 
a person charged with a criminal offence is innocent until his guilt is proven, an 
Accused person who has not been tried should be granted bail unless it is shown by 
the prosecution that there are substantial grounds for believing that: 
   (a)  The Accused will fail to turn up at his trial or to surrender to custody, or 
   (b) The Accused may commit further offences, or 
   (c)  He will obstruct the course of Justice.’’  
In addition to explaining the conditions precluding grant of bail, the above case27 
provides a circumstance for the derogation of the right to a fair hearing, but only in so far as 
the right to bail is concerned. This derogation is not at all fatal to an accused’s right to  a fair 
hearing as first under Article 49(h), grant of bail is left to the court’s discretion and as in the 
aforementioned case, the judge explained that the refusal to grant bail does not necessarily 
mean that the court has made a decision that the accused is guilty as charged. The decision can 
only be made after a full hearing and determination.28 
2.4 The Right to a Fair Hearing under International Instruments 
In addition to the constitutional provisions, international instruments have provided 
principles on the right to a fair hearing. Under Article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution, the 
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general rules of international law and customs form part of the laws of Kenya thus warranting 
the study of the right as explained in the international instruments. The case of David Njoroge 
Macharia v Republic29 confirms this position as the court acknowledged the radical shift the 
2010 constitution provided in recognising international law.  The Judge stated that; 
 “Kenya is traditionally a dualist system, thus treaty provisions do not have 
immediate effect in domestic law nor do they provide a basis upon which an action 
may be commenced in domestic courts. For international law to become part and 
parcel of national law, incorporation is necessary, either by new legislation, amended 
legislation or existing legislation. However, this position may have changed after the 
coming into force of our new Constitution”.  
And in Rono v Rono,30 the case endorsed the provisions of the former case. The Judge 
stated that;  
“Even though Kenya subscribes to the common law view that international 
law is only part of domestic law where it has been specifically incorporated, current 
thinking in the common law theory is that both international customary law and treaty 
law can be applied by state courts where there is no conflict with existing state law, 
even in the absence of implementing legislation”. 
2.41 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the right to a fair hearing 
is provided under Articles 7, 9, 10, and 11. Under these provisions, equality before the law 
without discrimination is protected, arbitrary arrests,31 detentions and exile are listed as actions 
illegal against persons.32 The right to a fair hearing is also expressly provided by the instrument 
to the extent that persons are accorded equality in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal trial,33 and the presumption of 
innocence as well as the right not to be charged guilty for a crime that did not exist as well as 
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30 Rono v Rono [2005] eKLR. 
31 Article 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).  
32 Article 9, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
33 Article 10, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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the imposition of a punishment that is disproportionate to the offence committed34 is listed as 
a fair trial right.  
2.42 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) under Article 7 speaks 
of the right to a fair hearing as follows:  
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: 
 (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental 
rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulation and customs in force; 
 (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; 
 (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice and; 
 (d)  the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.    
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally 
punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence 
for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can 
be imposed only on the offender. 
On the face of it, the ACHPR describes the right in the same manner as the Constitution 
however, it further includes the requirement that punishment ought to be meted out on the 
convicted offender alone.35 This in effect further enhances the right to a fair hearing by ensuring 
that only an offender suffers punishment and not an innocent person. The instrument’s 
elaborate provisions are important to the study as they also apply in Kenya. This was 
demonstrated in 
The Matter of African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights v The Republic of Kenya,36 
where in accepting that the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, the Judge enumerated that  
“…  However, before ordering provisional measures, the Court need not 
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but simply needs to satisfy 
itself, prima facie, that it has jurisdiction. The Court notes that Article 3(1) of the 
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Protocol provides that “the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and 
disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation of the Charter, this Protocol and 
any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. The Court 
further notes that the Respondent ratified the Charter, which came into force on the 
21st of October 1986, on the 23rd of January 1992 and deposited its instruments of 
ratification on 10 February 1992, and further that Respondent ratified the Protocol, 
which came into force on the 25th of January 2004, on the 4th of February 2004 and 
deposited its instruments of ratification on 18 February 2005 and is therefore a party 
to both instruments…’’  
In this regard, the application of the ACHPR provisions may be shown to apply as in 
the case of Republic and The Subordinate Court of the 1st Class Magistrate At City Hall and 
The Attorney General Exparte Yougindard Pall Sennik C.G. Retreat Limited.37 Justice J.G. 
Nyamu, in exterminating the charges against the defendant and granting the orders of certiorari 
as well as barring further criminal proceedings against the accused, considered the meaning 
and application of the right to a fair hearing in light of the ACHPR. In his words; 
“Article 7 of the African Charter imposes a legal duty on state parties to 
provide competent or impartial court or tribunal. At the same time Article 26 of the 
African Charter requires state parties to guarantee the independence of the courts.’’38 
Furthermore the judge emphasised that,  
“…So important is the right to a fair trial that the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right that may suffer no exception.  
Thus Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights does not allow 
derogation in respect of this right even in situations of public emergencies.’’39 
 In the same case, the Judge further provided a second International Instrument 
necessary in defining the right to a fair hearing. The judge stated;  
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“…Article 60 of the Charter permits the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights to draw inspiration from other international instruments and for this 
reason Article 14 of the ICCPR does apply to Charter parties.”40  
2.43 Right to a Fair Hearing under the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 
 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) provides soft law 
on the interpretation of the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
The ACmHPR explains the provisions of Article 7 of the ACHPR protecting the right to a fair 
hearing in a similar manner.41However, the ACmHPR further explains the right to a fair hearing 
to include a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. In regard to 
a public hearing, the ACmHPR describes such a hearing to be conducted before a legally 
constituted, competent and impartial judicial body and this extends to both criminal and civil 
proceedings.  
The provisions of the ACmHPR were interpreted in the case of Constitutional Rights 
Project and Others v Nigeria.42 The Nigerian government promulgated some military decrees 
proscribing over thirteen newspapers and magazines published by three media houses. The 
decrees prohibited media houses from publishing and circulating any content for six months, 
with a possible extension period. At the time the law was passed, the media houses had pending 
suits in court concerning illegal invasion and closure of their premises. The African 
Commission held the act to be a violation of the right to a fair hearing namely the right to be 
heard as under Article 7 (1) of the ACHPR. The ACmHPR held that the executive decree 
infringed on the media houses right of hearing as it was enacted in the process of litigation. 
The legislation as enacted, denied the national courts any jurisdiction to hear matters relating 
to the media houses. This in effect meant that the media houses could not have their civil 
proceedings concluded, and their rights fully determined. The ACmHPR also examined the 
background of the matter and found that though it related to a military tribunal affair, military 
tribunals were not exempted from the provisions of the right to a fair hearing under the ACHPR. 
The ACmHPR held that there was a violation of the right to a fair hearing and stated that every 
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adjudicatory body is subjected to requirements of fairness, openness, justice, independence, 
and due process as proper to the right to a fair hearing.  
Further, in Courson v Equatorial Guinea,43 the ACmHPR interpreted the provisions of 
Article 7 of the ACHR on the right to prepare defence. The ACmHPR held that the protection 
of the right does not to extend to situations where an accused is unable to prepare a defence by 
reason of their defence counsel failing to fulfil their duties. In this case, the defence counsel 
failed to raise objections, call in witnesses and adduce sufficient evidence owing to a lack of 
due diligence on his part. It was held that there was no violation of the right to prepare a 
defence.  
Where an accused’s evidence is confiscated unlawfully by the police prior to trial, this 
constitutes a violation of the right to prepare a defence as under Article 7(1) (c) of the ACHR.44                         
In International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria,45 files and documents 
required by the accused persons for their defence were removed from their residences and 
offices when security forces searched them during the trial. The ACmHPR interpreted Article 
7(1) (c) of the ACHR in favour of the accused.  
2.44 Right to A Fair Hearing under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to a 
fair hearing is provided in Article 14. The statute explains the nature of the right in similar 
terms as Article 50 of the Constitution of Kenya. However, the instrument provides an extra 
element; the element of equality before the courts or any tribunal.46 The effect of this provision 
was demonstrated in R v Adan Kenyan Wehliye Criminal47 where a constitutional court quashed 
a nolle proseque entered by the Attorney General after 11 witnesses out of a possible 40 
witnesses had testified.  The court held that the entry of the nolle proseque at that stage in order 
to re-charge the accused with other accomplices was prejudicial to the trial rights of the accused 
as it had breached the right of equality before the tribunal.  
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2.45 Right to A Fair Hearing explained by the Human Rights Committee 
 The Human Rights Committee, provides for the right to a fair hearing under Article 14 
of the Human Rights Committee General Comment  No. 32 (the General Comment).48 The 
General Comment explains that the right to equality before the courts and tribunals and to a 
fair trial is a key element of human rights protection and serves as a procedural means to 
safeguard the rule of law. This ensures the proper administration of justice, and further 
guarantees a series of specific rights.49 The general comment explains the right the same way 
as other international instruments. However, the general comment further elaborates the right 
of equality before courts and tribunals. The general comment provides that the right to equality 
before courts and tribunals not only applies to courts and tribunals but it must also be respected 
whenever domestic laws entrust a judicial body with a judicial task.50 This interpretation was 
held in Perterer v Austria.51 In this case, the applicant had been dismissed from his work on 
allegations of professional shortcomings and the complaint filed with Disciplinary Commission 
for Employees of Municipalities of the Province of Salzburg. The applicant sought to challenge 
the composition of the trial senate. He argued that the two members nominated by the 
municipality of Saalfelden lacked independence and impartiality due to their status as 
municipal officials or employees. The challenge was dismissed and held not to apply against 
the chairperson of the Senate. The Human Rights Committee however applied the provisions 
of the general comment and found that the challenge was valid. The Senate was exercising a 
judicial task and thus the provisions on the right to a fair hearing still applied.  
2.46 Right to A Fair Hearing under European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under Article 6 provides for the 
right to a fair Trial in the following respect;  
1. That in the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charge against the accused, one is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment 
shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part 
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
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society, where the interest of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties 
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.  
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty according to law.  
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: To be 
informed promptly in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and 
cause of accusation against him; 
4. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;  
5. To defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests 
of Justice so require;  
6. To examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him;  
7. To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court.  
The above provisions are similar to Kenya’s Constitutional provisions. The provisions 
however, explain the requirements of a public trial detailing the exception of circumstances 
where media and the general public may be excluded because of prejudice caused to the 
interests of justice or where it would contravene public morals or jeopardize national 
security.52 A further perspective to the circumstance limiting the application of the right 
would be as under the Vienna Convention53 granting diplomats and heads of states 
immunity from the trial jurisdiction of states. The principle stems from the doctrine of 
equality of states as under the United Nations Charter.54 This principle, in its application 
implies that the right to a fair hearing as under article 1 of the ECHR would not be breached 
where a matter is barred from proceeding because the other party to the matter is protected 
by diplomatic immunity.55 In fact, the contrary would prove to be a breach of international 
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law principles and would lead to state responsibility as was the case in Germany v Italy.56 
This standpoint has also been confirmed in the case of Karen Njeri Kandie v Alssane Ba 
and Shelter Afrique57 where the Appellant was unable to seek redress for alleged assault 
perpetrated by the first respondent; the Managing Director to the second Respondent. In 
denying the Appellant redress, the Court of Appeal stated that its rationale rested on the 
fact that the court lacked jurisdiction on the matter as the first respondent was protected 
under diplomatic immunity, being a diplomat of the Somali Government. The court further 
turned down the appellant’s plea; that terminating the case would lead to an infringement 
of her right to a fair hearing as under the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR as relied 
upon by her council. The Court stated that; 
 “…the conclusion is inescapable that the immunity that attaches to the 2nd 
respondent and to its officers such as the 1st respondent finds recognition and 
legitimacy from international treaties entered into by Kenya including the Vienna 
Convention which had express validation by the clear constitutional text found in 
Article 2(6) of the 2010 Constitution. In so far as they impact and implicate Article 
48 of the right to access to justice, they constitute a legitimate limitation to the right. 
Moreover, they are not, in all the circumstances of the case, disproportionate to the 
legitimate aims of conferment of state immunity. As regards the 1st respondent, we 
find and hold that whatever doubts, restrictions, qualifications and erosion may have 
attended State Immunity from its former hallowed perch of absolute sway, he remains 
invested with diplomatic immunity which is wider and has not suffered any 
diminution since the coming into force of the Vienna Convention. He is therefore 
quite completely immunized from criminal or civil proceedings before Kenyan Courts 
no matter how desirable or expedient such proceedings may seem. These holdings 
suffice to dispose of this appeal with the result that it fails in entirety.”58 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also provided interpretation on the 
right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the ECHR. In Zimmerman and Steiner v Switzerland59 
the right to have a trial within a reasonable time, was stated as a significant right to be protected. 
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The ECtHR stated the duty lies on the contracting state to organise its legal system to allow the 
courts to comply with this requirement. In this case, the trial delayed owing to backlog in the 
work of Switzerland’s court system. The ECtHR found that there was a violation of Article 
6(1) of the ECHR as the state had not taken adequate measures to cope with the situation. The 
ECtHR explained adequate measures to include; appointment of additional judges, however an 
exception to a violation of the right exists where the backlog is temporary and exceptional and 
the state has taken necessary measures to remedy the situation. The ECtHR also considered the 
political and social conditions60 at the time and found that Switzerland was well capable to deal 
with the backlog. The aggrieved party was awarded damages to remedy the denial of the right 
to have the trial conducted with reasonable time. 
 In Saunders v the United Kingdom,61 the ECtHR held that though Article 6 of the ECHR 
did not expressly mention the right to silence as well as the right not to incriminate oneself, the 
right is generally recognised by international standards. This right was explained as a 
significant part of a fair trial as under Article 6. The court further explained that the right 
protects the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thus guarding against 
miscarriages of justice. The rationale given was that the prosecution should rely on legally 
obtained evidence and the accused should not be oppressed to give evidence to his detriment, 
the right further protects the presumption of innocence.  
2.47 Right to A Fair Hearing under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 Finally, the right to a fair Hearing may be explained by the provisions in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The instrument under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide 
the right to a fair hearing as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.     
2. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.   
3. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him.     
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4. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence.   
5. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the penal offence was committed. 
In explaining the nature of the right to a fair hearing, being similar to the Constitutional 
provisions, the UDHR under Article 8 provides a rubber stamp on the binding authority of 


















The Nature of Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Kenya. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature of TDRMs. In achieving this objective, the nature of 
TDRMs is explained in reference to statutes regulating TJSs, case law and a desk study on TJS 
in communities in Kenya. The chapter serves as a precursor to chapter four which examines 
the extent to which of the right to a fair hearing in TDRMs is incorporated. Three communities 
have been selected for this purpose as a representative sample of TDRMS in Kenya; the Somali, 
Agikuyu and Pokot communities. 
3.2 The Legal Framework in Kenya on TDRMS 
3.21. Statutory Provisions. 
a.) TDRMS under the Constitution of Kenya 
Under Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK), TDRMs are recognised as a form of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism.62 Under Article 159 (3) of the CoK, restrictions on 
the use of TDRMs are set out to the effect that TDRMs are not to be used in a manner that 
contravenes the Bill of Rights, are repugnant to justice and morality and inconsistent with the 
Constitution or any written law.63  
 Article 48 of the Constitution provides a basis for the justification of the existence of 
TDRMs. The provision directs the State to ensure access to justice for all persons, and where 
a fee is required, it shall be reasonable and not impeding to access to justice.64 TDRMs enhance 
the right to access to justice for the marginalised and poor people65 who may otherwise not 
have access to the formal courts owing to the expenses involved or the low literacy levels that  
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impede people from understanding the formalities applied in the court system.   
 Under Chapter four of the CoK on the Bill of Rights, a key provision applicable to 
TDRMs is Article 21. The article,66 charges all state organs and all public officers with the duty 
to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, this is defined to include women, 
children, persons with disability, youth, members of minority or marginalised groups, different 
religious, ethnic and cultural communities. The provision is relevant in the sense that the 
adjudicators in TDRMs execute public functions and for the sole reason of enhancing harmony 
in society.  
Article 56 provides for the protection of minorities and marginalised groups.67 Article 
56(d) directs the state to put in place affirmative action programmes designed to ensure that 
minorities and marginalised groups develop their cultural values, languages and practices.68 
This in relation to TDRMs may be construed to further legitimise the existence of TDRMs 
institutions and their applicability in dispute resolution.    
Under Chapter five on Land and Environment, the use of TDRMs in Kenya is held to 
be applicable. Article 60(1) (g) encourages communities to settle land disputes through local 
community initiatives consistent with the Constitution.69When read with Article 159, the 
provision may be construed to include TDRMs.  
From the provisions of Article 44, persons’ rights to use language and participate in 
cultural life of their choice are protected.70 The provision, under Article 44(3) stipulates that a 
person shall not compel another person to perform, observe or undergo any cultural practise or 
rite.71 In the case where one of the parties does not consent to resolving their matter through 
TDRMs, this provision protects such a party’s interest and thus it stands as a limitation to the 
application of TDRMs in such instances. 
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b.) TDRMS under the Judicature Act 
 Under Section 3 (2) of the Judicature Act, The High Court, the Court of Appeal and all 
subordinate courts are required to be guided by African customary law in civil cases in so far 
as it is applicable and not repugnant to justice and morality.72 Though the wordings of the Act 
do not expressly refer to TDRMs, they provide a basis for the operation of the laws governing 
TDRMs being customary law as well as limiting the jurisdiction of TDRMs to civil matters.73  
c.) TDRMs under the Marriage Act. 
Section 68 of the Marriage Act empowers TDRMs to apply conciliatory measures in 
marital disputes relating to customary marriages, before the court can determine the petition 
for the dissolution of the marriage.74 The provision gives the inference that TDRMs are under 
the court’s supervision in relation to marital disputes as there is a requirement for the 
preparation of a report of the process for the court.75 Section 69 further legitimises TDRMs 
where grounds for divorce under customary laws which originate from TDRMs, are recognised 
as valid grounds to grant dissolution of a customary marriage.76 
d.) TDRMs under the Environment and Land Court Act 
 The Environment and Land Court Act (the Act) recognises TDRMs as a valid dispute 
resolution method. Under section 18 of the Act, the court is guided to apply traditional cultural 
and social principles applied by any community in Kenya in the management of the 
environment or natural resources where relevant and consistent with other written laws.77 
Given that the customary principles are derived from TDRMs, the provision impliedly 
recognises the application of TDRMs in land and environment conservation matters. An 
express provision as to the applicability of TDRMs in resolving environmental disputes is 
provided under section 20 of the Act. The provision provides courts the discretion to refer 
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matters to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods in which TDRMs are categorised as 
amongst the legitimate ADR methods.78 
e.) TDRMs under the National Land Commission Act 
  
 The National Land Commission Act (the Act) establishes the National Land 
Commission (NLC) for the purpose of management and administration of land according to 
the provisions of Article 60 of the CoK.79 Under section 5 of the Act, the NLC is charged with 
the function to encourage the application of TDRMs in land conflicts.80 This provision thus 
provides TDRMs the jurisdiction to adjudicate over land related disputes.   
3.22 Case Law Demonstrating the Application of Statutory Provisions Regulating 
TDRMS 
In Joseph Kalenyan Cheboi & Others v William Suter and Samuel Biwott ,81 the dispute 
arose from an issue of land encroachment contrary to the Marakwet customs and the plaintiff 
applied to have the matter settled through TDRMs. The court, relying on the provisions of 
Article 159 of the CoK allowed the matter to be determined by the clan elders (the Osis) of the 
clan to which the parties belonged.   
 The extent to which TDRMs can be applicable in resolving disputes was demonstrated 
in Erastus Gitonga Mutuma v Mutia Kanuno and Others.82 In this case, the Judge issued an 
injunction against the defendants from instituting proceedings against the plaintiff through 
TDRMs. The plaintiff proved that the council of elders breached the constitutional 
requirements.83 The plaintiff successfully demonstrated the uncouth and unfair nature of the 
Njuri Ncheke trial, amounting to repugnancy to justice and morality.  
In the case of Lubaru M‟imanyara v Daniel Murungi,84 the court provided an 
interpretation of Articles 60(1) (g) and 159(2) (c) of the Constitution. The parties had filed a 
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consent seeking to have a land dispute resolved by the Njuri Ncheke Council of elders of the 
Meru community.  The court granted the application stating that the constitutional provisions 
legitimized the application of TDRMs in resolving land issues.   
In Seth Michael Kaseme v Selina K. Ade,85 the Court of Appeal recognised the role of 
the Gasa Council of Elders of Northern Kenya to arbitrate a land dispute. The land dispute was 
referred to adjudication by TDRMs. Similarly, in Japheth Kipkemboi Magut v National Land 
Commission and 2 others,86 one of the issues for determination was whether the NLC was a 
legitimate regulatory body and whether it had powers to refer land disputes to TDRMs. The 
court recognised the NLC as a creation of the CoK and further confirmed its mandate to 
encourage the application of TDRMs in land conflicts.  
TDRMs are conciliatory in nature as they apply principles of restorative justice. In 
Repulic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed,87 the court discharged and allowed the matter to be 
marked as settled where the defence proved that the parties had settled the matter according to 
the Somali TJS. According to Somali customs, once compensation in the form of camels, goats 
and other traditional ornaments were paid to the aggrieved family, the matter was rendered 
settled. Thus, the parties to the case were restored and were unwilling to continue with the 
mater. The conduct of witnesses in this case, guided by the Somali customs; not to testify in a 
matter already settled, persuaded the court to drop the matter due to lack of evidence as well as 
the proof that the ends of justice had been met and the parties were restored in the absence of 
a court proceedings.   
3.3 The Nature of TDRMs in Kenya  
 TDRMs are informal dispute resolution methods based on traditions and customs of 
people in a community.88 TDRMs are usually ethnic centered functioning among a particular 
community sharing the same ethnic language and whose rules are enforced through moral and 
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customary sanctions.89 The nature of TDRMs in Kenya may be explained based on the Somali 
community, and Agikuyu community as a representative of the application of TDRMs.  
3.31 TDRMs in the Somali Community 
In the Somali community,90 disputes are resolved through a customary court known as 
the Maslah.91 During Maslah hearings, the elders sit under trees in designated spaces or in 
mosques and places of worship in the villages to listen to the disputing parties and arrive at a 
solution. The elders listen to the disputants only after their emotions have cooled down and 
after customary ceremonies have been conducted. For example, in conflicts that have resulted 
in death, parties can only be heard after the lapse of the set mourning period and fulfilment of 
burial rituals.92 The parties to a dispute are heard and at the end of the hearing, the party at fault 
is required to pay compensation to the injured family or clan. The compensation may be in the 
form of an animal or blood money, calculated on the basis of the severity of the wrong done.93  
3.32 TDRMs in the Agikuyu Community 
The Agikuyu community has an elaborate structure of conflict resolution. In this 
community, disputes are first resolved at the family level where the father is endorsed by the 
community’s custom to act as a judge in settling minor disputes between members of his 
family.94 Where the dispute in question is deemed more complex, the heads of families within 
a kinsfolk (mbari) are called together and act in their capacity as elders of the council of elders 
(kiama) in the community.95 The disputes are heard and determined within the precincts of the 
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family homesteads as the family council (ndundu ya mocie) being privileged to treat the matter 
as a family concern.96 The presiding elders act in an arbitrator’s capacity as their mandate is to 
point out the recognised tradition and custom of the family to be followed, including finding 
means by which disputing parties can reach a mutual agreement without resulting to vengeance 
that could result in a breakup of the family group.97 The next level of dispute resolution is the 
public court of elders (the kiama) which can only hear a matter after it has been heard at the 
family level. The kiama is constituted of male elders who have met the requirements of the 
community’s rites of passage. The kiama meets in open air spaces or under a tree (keharo) to 
adjudicate over disputes. The procedure set in determining the dispute is that the offended party 
has to inform the members of the kiama of the dispute the night before the matter is to be heard 
and on the following day, present himself to the court together with the offender. On the day 
of dispute determination, the elders have to be served with a brew in the form of fermented 
sugar cane which is for the sole purpose of fulfilling a ritual oath taking ceremony (rohea rwa 
goitanga). The ceremony involves invoking the ancestral spirits to assist in adjudicating the 
matter as well as administering an oath which binds the parties to strictly adhere to the decision 
of the elders lest a curse befalls them.98 The trial then commences with each party stating their 
case and defence after which their witnesses can attest to the same, afterwards, the elders 
appoint a committee (ndundu) which then deliberates on the issues and formulate a verdict. 
The ndundu comprises of members of the community except relatives of the disputing parties.99 
The senior elder then announces the decision of ndundu after which parties may be asked 
whether they want leave to appeal if not, the decision stands binding and the dispute deemed 
resolved.  The appeal however, lies in the same court level (the kiama) only that a new 
committee (ndundu) is selected to hear the trial a fresh. The grounds of appeal are however not 
light and one has to satisfy the elders that they were serious, lest they face punishment in the 
form of a dismissal and a curse.100 The mode of restitution includes compensation in the case 
of theft, a curse upon a person, and solitary confinement or being ostracised.101  
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3.33 TDRMs in the Pokot Community.  
 The Pokot community dispute resolution mechanism is based on its community 
structure. The family being the basic unit, the clan and the council of elders (kokwo) form the 
main institutions of conflict management.102 Where conflicts exist within the family unit, the 
father is deemed the head of conflict resolution and is the administrator of all family matters 
including property, bride price, inheritance and land issues. The clan consists of a collection of 
the extended families and it serves as an appeal court in which disputes determined in the family 
level may be heard a fresh.103 At this level, at times neighbours (porror) may be called to hear 
and arbitrate family disputes.104 The council of elders (kokwo) stands as the highest conflict 
resolution institution. The kokwo is made up of respected old men who are considered 
knowledgeable in community matters including the culture and history. The kokwo are good 
orators, and use proverbs and wisdom phrases in resolving disputes. The members of the kokwo 
come from every village in the community to ensure full representation. A unique feature of 
the Pokot TJS is that the kokwo also includes women in the dispute resolution process, as the 
community is matriarchal in nature. The women seated in the kokwo are selected based on 
seniority in age and contribute to the proceedings while seated.105 The women participate as 
documentalists so as to provide reference for future meetings. They are allowed to advise the 
council based on occurrence or cultural beliefs, and they voice their opinions prior to the 
making of a verdict.106 The kokwo observes the rules of natural justice as disputing parties are 
allowed to narrate their case and they are given representation in the process; an equivalent of 
lawyers in the formal court process.107 The punishments imposed by the kokwo include fines, 
death, punishing the whole family or clan where one member commits an offence and public 
ridicule and excommunication of the community. The kokwo considers theft within the 
community a serious offence punishable by a range of fines including death, however theft 
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from other communities is not considered an offence but a cultural practice of restocking.108 


























                                                                 








This chapter examines the nature of Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms as 
explained in chapter three with a view to establish whether the right to a fair hearing as 
explained in chapter two is incorporated in TJs. The chapter identifies the rights to a fair hearing 
and examines whether the right is engendered in TDRMs in regard to the nature of the TDRMs 
of the communities (Somali, Agikuyu and Pokot), as explained in chapter three.  
4.2 Examining the Incorporation of the Right to A Fair Hearing in TDRMs 
a.) The right to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay 
Looking at the nature of TDRMs, this right is not enshrined. The Somali community’s 
dispute resolution mechanism as described in chapter three, demonstrates this. The Somali 
customs require the elders to only listen to matters once Somali rituals have taken place 
according to their customs.109 Thus where a burial is to take place, no matter is heard until the 
lengthy customary process has taken place. This in turn delays the execution of justice to an 
accused person.  
b.) The right to appeal 
In the Somali TJS, members of the community highly esteem their TJS, such that they 
consider the formal court processes untrustworthy as such decisions made by the Maslah Court 
as in the Somali community stand binding on the parties.110 The parties have no other option 
but to comply with the decision, this denies an aggrieved party the right to appeal.111 Similarly, 
looking at the Agikuyu TJS, though there seems to be an appellate structure, the community 
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places high regard to the elders and the oaths taken during the trial process such that an appeal 
would be unheard of for fear of invoking curses upon the individual or the entire community. 
This in turn intimidates a person from exercising their right to appeal Further, in the Pokot 
community, the right to appeal is also not incorporated as the Pokot just as with the Somali and 
Agikuyu communities, highly esteem their elders. An appeal would be deemed as looking 
down upon the decision making skills of the elders and is taken a sign of a bad omen attracting 
a curse on an aggrieved individual.112 This still stands as though the Pokot seem to have an 
appeal structure, serious crimes such as theft and murder are only heard at the kokwo level in 
which disputes may not be appealed thus an accused’s right to appeal for such serious offences 
is not upheld.113 
c.) The right to be heard and equality before the law. 
Owing to the paternalistic nature of the customs followed in TDRMs, women are denied 
the right to be heard and the right to equality before the law. In the Somali community for 
instance, women are perceived not to have a voice in the TJS leave alone appear during the 
proceedings for fear of provoking disharmony during the trial process.114 This in effect denies 
women the right to be present at trial.115  
Upon examining the Pokot community, the community’s TDRM seems to protect the 
right to equality before the law by the fact that women are given a chance to participate in the 
dispute resolution process. However, this does not fully incorporate the right to equality as the 
men in the community highly dominate the proceedings and the final decision is left to them, 
this in turn jeopardises accused women’s right to a fair hearing.  
d.) The right to a public trial 
On the other hand, TDRMs are only limited to adjudicating matters in the community, 
at the family or clan level. Consequently, as in the Pokot community, where there are inter-
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community conflicts, the matters are not heard as there is no dispute resolution mechanism for 
such matters. In such instances, justice is not served as parties fall in the hands of jungle law 
in which the right to be heard is not applicable.116 This consequently goes against the very 
precepts of natural justice in particular the maxim; audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) 
and nemo judex in parte sua (no person may judge their own case).117 
Given the customary practices allowing early childhood marriages,118 and strong beliefs 
that regard children as inferior in society and people who lack a voice, TDRMs deny children 
the right to a public trial. This situation is aggravated in defilement cases where children are 
forced to marry the perpetrator in order to avert shame upon the family instead of the 
perpetrator being publicly tried,119 and the child being given a chance to publicly testify during 
trial and the offender being punished accordingly.   
e.) The right to representation and to remain silent and not testify during proceedings . 
 A characteristic of TDRMs as brought out by the TJS in the Pokot community is giving 
a chance to the accused to speak during the proceedings, in a sense providing the right to be 
heard. This fact however, turns out to infringe on the accused’s right to a fair hearing as they 
are not represented by a council of their own choice, and their right to stay silent is not present.  
Indeed an accused responding in silence to a question asked by an elder is deemed highly 
disrespectful and the accused has no option but to speak.120 
 
f. The Right to have adequate time to prepare a defence. 
 
 In addition to denying an accused the right to representation as explained above, an 
accused is denied the chance to adequately prepare a defence. This is evidenced by TDRMs in 
the Agikuyu community as examined under chapter three. In the community, the aggrieved 
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party summons the elders presiding over the dispute a night prior to the date of hearing. The 
accused, is then expected to appear for trial and ready to answer any questions and charges 
levelled against them.121 This practise out rightly denies the accused a chance to adduce and 
challenge any evidence procured by the aggrieved party. Further, the denial of time to choose 
a counsel of one’s choice also deprives the accused the right to prepare their defence, this 
proves detrimental to an accused especially in allegations of felonious crimes.122      
g.) The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
 TDRMs are adjudicated based on customary laws which do not incorporate the 
presumption of innocence or the aspect of criminal culpability mainly mens rea. The elders in 
determining criminal matters run the process as if the accused is guilty and usually it is the 
accused’s task to discharge the heavy burden of proving their innocence.123 Further, the elders 
do not look at the intention of the accused (mens rea) in deciding the matter as they are devoid 
of the concept. This deprives an accused of their right to a fair hearing as they are perceived 
guilty from the onset without taking into account mitigating factors.124Thus for example where 
an accused commits a crime out of self-defence, the elders owing to a lack of legal 
knowledge,125 do not take into account the mens rea element in determining the guilt 
conscience of an accused person.    
h.) The right to be heard before a fair and impartial tribunal 
 The rules of natural justice, in particular the bias rule126 requiring an adjudicator to be 
completely impartial in adjudicating the matters before him, are not upheld in TDRMs. Owing 
to the paternalistic nature of TDRMs, apparent bias is seen in cases where the accused are 
women standing trial presided over by male elders and as in the Somali community, they are 
not allowed to speak. This hinders the execution of justice. On the other hand, where one of 
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the parties to a dispute has blood or family ties to an elder presiding over the matter, actual bias 
appears as the TDRMs do not afford an elder the luxury to recuse themselves. Indeed one of 
the recommendations set for TDRMS by KELIN Kenya conference paper,127 in enhancing 
access to justice for women’s property rights in TDRMs was the need for elders to recuse 
themselves in the event where one of the parties is a relative.128   In sum, the above demonstrates 
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Findings Recommendations and Conclusion. 
5.0 Introduction 
 This chapter provides for the findings of the study based on the objectives set out in 
chapter one, recommendations as a result of the findings and a conclusion of the study. The 
study was conducted with the aim of establishing whether TDRMs engender the right to a fair 
hearing in the dispute resolution processes.   
5.1 Findings  
a.) What is entailed in the right to a fair hearing? 
 The study finds that the right to a fair hearing in Kenya is extensively provided by the 
constitution which also includes provisions of international instruments as detailed in chapter 
two of this study. The right to a fair hearing as explained in chapter two stands to protect an 
accused from the institution of allegations to the end of the trial process. The study also finds 
that the right to a fair hearing is an important right based on the principles of natural justice as 
explained in chapter one under the theoretical framework of the study and hence the need for 
its inclusion in TDRM dispute resolution processes.  
b.) The nature of TDRMs 
 Traditional Dispute Resolution mechanisms are based on customary practices and 
principles as explained in chapter three. TDRMs however do not engender legal principles; in 
particular the right to a fair hearing as examined under chapter four owing to the low literacy 
levels129 of the adjudicators. This in turn hinders the execution of justice according to natural 
justice principles.  
c.) The need for TDRMs in dispute resolution in Kenya. 
The CoK recognises TDRMs as an official alternative dispute resolution mechanism130 
which enhances the access to justice for the marginalized and the poor.131 This recognition 
protects the right to access to justice as under Article 48 of the CoK.132 Further, the recognition 
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of TDRMs  reflect the spirit of the constitution under Article 11133 which recognizes the diverse 
cultures in Kenya and protects the rights of citizens to choose and participate in the cultural life 
as under Article 44,134 this includes participation in TDRMs which are organs of civil society.  
c.) The extent to which TDRMs engender the right to a fair hearing.  
 As outlined in chapter three and four, this study finds that given the nature of TDRMs, 
the right to a fair hearing is far from being incorporated to the dispute resolution processes. The 
study finds that there is a need to incorporate the right in TDRMs given the constitutional and 
statutory provisions legitimising their use in dispute resolution. Furthermore, it is foreseeable 
that TDRMs will be increasingly applicable in resolving a wider range of disputes; including 
criminal135 matters excluding felonies as stated in Juma Faraji Serenge alias Juma Hamisi v 
Republic.136  
5.2 Recommendations 
a. The protection of the right to a fair hearing in TDRMs  
The adjudication of disputes in TDRMs should be modified to include the aspects of 
the right to a fair hearing in order to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and 
to adhere to the principles of natural justice in order for justice to be done. This may be achieved 
through establishing a separate legislation regulating TDRMs. The legislation should list the 
official TDRMs in the different communities in Kenya. The legislation should also outline the 
customary powers and functions of the elders in TDRMs, to reflect the principles of natural 
justice and thus include the right to a fair hearing in TDRMs. The legislation should also detail 
the structure of TDRMs to provide for an appeal process within the traditional courts. Further, 
the legislation should direct that the trials in TDRMs be documented and the documentation be 
passed to the formal courts in order to ensure effective supervision of TDRMs.137   
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b. The nature of TDRMs 
Given that the adjudicators in TDRMs have low literacy levels138 as stated in chapter four and 
three, civic education programs should be carried out. These programs would be helpful in 
educating the adjudicators in TDRMs in every community on the right to a fair hearing as well 
as its importance. In turn the execution of the program would aid in seeing that the right to a 
fair hearing is practically engendered in TDRMs.  
5.2 Conclusion 
 This study has met its objectives as well as responded to the statement of the problem.  
The objectives to be met were; 
i. To find out what is entailed in the right to a fair hearing.  
ii. To investigate the nature of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (TDRMs). 
iii. To examine whether TDRMs engender the right to a fair hearing in the proceedings.  
 
Objective i.  
This study has outlined the various elements on the right to a fair hearing including the 
regulatory framework protecting the right to a fair hearing in Kenya. Chapter two has explained 
the various statutes and case law explaining the nature and application of the right to a fair 
hearing.  
Objective ii.  
 The study has examined the nature of TDRMs in Kenya. The regulatory framework in 
Kenya legitimising their application as discussed in chapter three as well as the case study on 
the Somali, Agikuyu and Pokot communities has proven fit in meeting the objective.  
Objective iii. 
 The study as under chapter four has demonstrated the extent to which the right to a fair 
hearing is engendered in TDRMs. Under chapter five, the study has provided recommendations 
on how the right to a fair hearing can be engendered in TDRMs.  
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 The hypothesis was that TDRMs do not engender the right to a fair hearing in dispute 
resolution.  
 This study tested and proved the hypothesis by examining the nature of the right to a 
fair hearing as well as the nature of TDRMs in Kenya. Chapter three has highlighted the nature 
of TDRMs. Chapter four on the other hand has examined the extent to which the right to a fair 
hearing is engendered in TDRMs and has proven the hypothesis right.  The aspects of the right 
to a fair hearing as discussed under chapter two in meeting objective one of the study, are not 
fully engendered in TDRMs. In sum, the right to a fair hearing is an important right and its lack 
of inclusion in TDRMs jeopardizes the execution of justice which demands that it must not 
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